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ABSTRACT: Maintaining and restoring electricity after a disaster helps to preserve the health and well-being of the
elderly who are at increased risk of heat stress and may be dependent upon life-sustaining medical equipment. Mitigation
policies altered in reaction to increased public interest without thorough consideration of industry-specific resources may
contribute to delays in implementation and unrealized potential for emergency power coverage within individual facilities.
The objectives of this research are twofold: (i) to examine the relationship between preexisting conditions of life-safety
systems at facilities and date of implementation of emergency power regulation improvements and (ii) to assess the role of
interagency connections—such as emergency management, fire safety, health care administration, and electricity providers—in facilitating compliance with safety regulations. A case study regarding the capacity to implement new emergency
power regulations was conducted in Florida with 12 nursing homes affected by Hurricane Irma. The proposals to maintain
temperatures and life-sustaining equipment under the updated regulations were not consistent among nursing homes within
each county or between counties. Facilities with no preexisting life-safety violations were among the first to comply with new
emergency power regulations. Those with prior violations often utilized procedural updates and external resources to
comply. Nursing facilities that required additional support for remediation prior to the storm had plans approved earlier or
without a second review as compared with those relying on internal resources. These results establish a baseline for the
conditions associated with timely compliance including the importance of collective agency to mitigate risk.
KEYWORDS: Emergency preparedness; Emergency response; Risk assessment

1. Introduction
Hurricane Irma made landfall in Collier County, Florida, as a
category-3 storm on 10 September 2017 and passed through Polk
County, Florida, on 11 September 2017 (Fig. 1) (NHC 2017).
The storm was the most intense to make landfall in the United
States since Hurricane Katrina (Issa et al. 2018). Although a
majority of the 6.7 million power outages in the state of Florida
were resolved within a week of Hurricane Irma (Florida
Division of Emergency Management 2017b) some areas
throughout the state were still without power 2 weeks later.

a. Progression of the legislation
In response to postdisaster fatalities in nursing homes,
Florida Governor Rick Scott enacted an emergency action on
16 September 2017. The order required that emergency power
plans of skilled nursing and assisted living facilities be updated to
adopt changes to power supplies—such as ensuring adequate generator capacity, fuel storage, and fuel delivery arrangements—within
60 days (Florida Division of Emergency Management 2017a).
The governor’s emergency action became permanent in
March 2018 when he approved Rule 59 A-4.1265. It required
nursing homes to provide 30 ft2 (;2.8 m2) of space per resident,
cooled to 818F (;278C) or lower. A total of 96 h of fuel for
backup power generation should be available between on-site
and off-site resources. Future generator maintenance in compliance with the life-safety code, fire prevention code, flammable and combustible liquids code, and standard for liquefied
natural gas was also mandatory. Further, Rule 59 A-4.1265
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extended the emergency power plan submission deadline to
April 2018 and implementation to June 2018. Statewide demands for increased generator and fuel storage capacity as well
as the increased number of inspections needed for upgraded
emergency power supplies delayed the receipt of new generators. Consequently, the permanent legislation further extended compliance deadlines to 1 January 2019, and 523
facilities received extensions. During the 2018 hurricane season, when another major storm, Hurricane Michael, made
landfall along the Florida Panhandle, only 184 of Florida’s
nursing homes met the state’s new emergency power supply
regulations (Sexton 2018). By 1 January 2019, the Florida
Agency for Health Care Administration (2017) reported that
489 facilities had not complied.

b. Heat, evacuation, and the elderly
Extreme weather contributes to power failure. For example,
tropical cyclones blow debris and disrupt power lines (Panteli
and Mancarella 2015). Prolonged power outages contribute
to a range of adverse health outcomes; heat-related fatalities
increase during blackouts (Anderson and Bell 2012; Byrd
and Matthewman 2014; Klinger et al. 2014; Pescaroli and
Alexander 2016). Medical and social factors contribute to the
elderly’s increased vulnerability to fluctuating environmental
conditions, such as heat (Gronlund et al. 2016; Åström et al.
2011; Hajat et al. 2010; Kovats and Hajat 2008). Studies have
also shown that reduced access to cooled spaces increases their
negative health outcomes as periods of elevated temperature
reduce thermoregulatory capacity (Eisenman et al. 2016).
Failed generators can increase heat-related morbidity or
mortality because no equipment, including that for cooling,
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FIG. 1. Track of Hurricane Irma (adapted from NHC 2017).

receives backup power (Smith et al. 2009). The accessibility of
resources to provide and sustain adequate emergency power is
critical to preserving life in elder-care facilities.
Power outages may delay emergency responders, limit access to health care facilities, and increase demand for generators and fuel to the point where availability of these assets
becomes scarce (Beatty et al. 2006; Hiete et al. 2011). Backup
power is not always guaranteed due to generator malfunction
(Kile et al. 2005). Infrastructural expansion offers a possible
solution to reduce heat vulnerability (Sheridan and Allen
2018). The way to leverage cross-sectoral resources to prioritize and implement infrastructural improvements needs to be
further explored (Palm 2009).
Nursing homes are under increased community scrutiny
because of the vulnerable population they serve (Montz et al.
2017). Care facilities must evacuate early and at great expense,
and therefore many opt to shelter in place (Hyer et al. 2006).
Clearly defined emergency staffing requirements and management roles benefit facility decision-makers (Qureshi et al.
2005). The decision to evacuate or prepare to shelter in place
is a complex one within the authority of facility management
(Root et al. 2007). On the one hand, Hyer (2013) found residents that do evacuate have higher death rates and requirements for acute care. On the other hand, those sheltering in
place are dependent upon the facility to withstand wind and
flood damage, meet power, food, and water demands and access hospitals to address emergent or heightened resident
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health concerns (Hyer 2013). Hurricane Katrina was an example of how facility failure contributes to increased deaths
with over 100 nursing-home-resident deaths among those that
sheltered in place (Hyer 2013). A clear description of resident
risk, available resources, and both internal and external communication should be included in evacuation decision-making
and emergency plans for sheltering in place (Hyer et al. 2007;
Hyer 2013).
A nursing home’s internal resources are not expected to suffice during a disaster (Myers and Bearss 2018). Coordination
with local and state partners facilitates shared best practices and
planning strategies to increase each facility’s capacity to simulate
and manage natural-hazard-related emergencies. The Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) emergency preparedness rule (CMS 2016) addressed previous shortcomings in
federal certification standards for state and local collaboration to
prepare skilled nursing facilities for hazards (Brown et al. 2007).
The CMS emergency preparedness rule also indicates a need
for participation in emergency simulations with external responders, which Whytlaw (2018) shows is an indicator of success
when a nursing-home facility encounters a hazard. Specifically,
emergency management exercises promote consistent levels of
coordination between nursing-home administrators, external
contractors and government officials across a given state, which
would otherwise vary based on individual perceptions of the
importance of collaboration (Whytlaw 2018).
The CMS emergency preparedness rule is an example of
coordination between health advocates and policy makers,
which is a vital for improving disaster outcomes for the elderly
(Aldrich and Benson 2008; Myers and Bearss 2018). Successful
advocacy allowed for the endorsement of the National Fire
Protection Association standards for generator maintenance
instead of creating redundancies and allowed facilities to include only the hazards relevant to their area in their plans
(Myers and Bearss 2018). Public–private sector coordination
provides a balance between the needed reforms and the financial stress and increased burdens on staff and officials that
they cause (Myers and Bearss 2018). In the case of Hurricane
Irma, preparedness measures were not always aligned with the
damage potential or track because of a lack of existing policy
requirements and engineering capability (Senkbeil et al. 2020,
2019). Since hurricanes are a known hazard for the state of
Florida, uniform regulation is desirable (Myers and Bearss
2018). Additional research is needed to identify how interagency connections influence policy implementation timelines.

c. Postdisaster organizational resilience
For elder-care facilities to continue to serve as many patients
as possible, they must maintain public trust. In areas with
hazard risk, it is imperative that facilities make the public
aware of preparedness plans and mitigation technologies
(Oleske 2001). Continuity of services and implementation of
mitigation initiatives, such as increased emergency power
supply regulation, is bolstered by both collaboration and redundancy (Weichselgartner and Kelman 2015). The initial
driver of postdisaster organizational resilience for nonprofit
health care and social services is incorporating emergent public
demand (Hutton et al. 2016). Public perception expands after
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blackouts to include access to cooled spaces for the elderly
(Abi Ghanem et al. 2016; Klinger et al. 2014). Specifically,
Hurricane Irma increased societal interest in elder care because nursing-home residents died from heat-related causes in
Hollywood, Florida (Chakalian et al. 2019; Pierce and West 2017).
The indicator of organizational resilience changes to alignment with government and other industry-specific partners as
the emergency stages progress (Hutton 2019). For Florida
nursing homes, this shift in focus from one stage to the next
allowed for revision of the original emergency action to ensure
appropriate levels of governance were consulted in policy
formation and implementation. Collective action and collaborative oversight have the potential to sustain resilience gained
from incorporating increased public demand through prioritization and resource sharing (Hutton 2018). For example,
Helsloot and Beerens (2009) documented that local governments capacity can be temporarily redirected to support the
elderly after a blackout (Helsloot and Beerens 2009). The existing federal, state, and local relationship between fire safety
and emergency preparedness requirements provided structure
but not necessarily the local capacity to scale up in time for
rapid implementation in Florida. Accounting for this discrepancy, Rule 59 A-4.1265 extended the compliance timeline.
Therefore, demonstrating progress toward implementation in
conjunction with partners became sufficient to sustain perceived resilience. Additional investigation into who is overseeing and administering regulatory compliance is needed to
determine the legitimacy and translation of perceived resilience to realized hazard mitigation.
A disconnect remains in feasibility and the desired timeline
articulated by the Florida Health Care Administration, which
sought to improve mitigation technology prior to the next
hurricane season. Traditionally emergency management goes
as follows: response, recovery, mitigation, preparation (Paul
2011). If the goal was to put mitigation in place before the next
hurricane season so that facilities would be better prepared,
Rule 59 A-4.1265 s initial timeline is necessary without extensions; however, since this timeline is not well aligned with the
time needed to recover.
Mitigation technologies, such as generator upgrades or levees, are in high demand after a disaster but may require years
of lobbying to plan, garner resources, and coordinate implementation (Paul 2011; Montz et al. 2017; Hutton et al. 2018).
Reduced planning and implementation timelines for such undertakings may limit the benefits by reducing the potential for
stakeholder input and comprehensive reform. Emergency
power supply upgrades for Florida’s nearly 700 nursing homes
is a costly effort because, even if the individual facilities have
the funds to make the improvements, they are reliant upon
external contractors and government officials for supplies, installation, and inspection. There is a missed opportunity in
Rule 59 A- 4.1265 because increased requirements to power
additional equipment that would further reduce the vulnerability of nursing-home residents beyond heat stress, such as
refrigerators for medication, are excluded. Additional research
is needed to identify how to reconcile these competing priorities and propose policies that more comprehensively reduce
vulnerability with achievable, urgent timelines.
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This case study assesses organizational resilience in and
proposes indicators of timely compliance in the elder-care industry. Two research questions are addressed: (i) what is the
relationship between preexisting conditions of life-safety systems at facilities and date of implementation of emergency
power regulation improvements and (ii) what is the role of
interagency connections—such as emergency management,
fire safety, health care administration, and electricity providers—in facilitating compliance with safety regulations. The
existing capacity and processes to identify and correct safety
deficiencies are analyzed. Findings establish a baseline for
the conditions associated with timely compliance including
the importance of agency connections to mitigate risk in
nursing homes.

2. Study area
Research occurred in Collier and Polk Counties in Florida,
for comparative purposes. Both counties were directly in the
path of Hurricane Irma and have different electricity providers
(Fig. 1). An urban location within each county was chosen for
this research: the City of Lakeland in Polk County and the City
of Naples in Collier County (Fig. 1).

a. Demographics
The potential demand for elder care in the immediate vicinity and within the broader city limits could influence the
capacity to provide service following the declaration of a state
of emergency. The population of Naples is 19 537 while
Lakeland’s population is 106 420 (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).
Approximately 20% of Lakeland’s population is 65 and older
(Fig. 2). Approximately 50% of Naples residents are 65 or
older (Fig. 3). An electrical outage that exceeds the amount of
generator fuel available at a residence or facility could cause
heat stress or prevent the use of life-sustaining technology and
necessitate a search for the nearest facility to maintain that
service. Hospitals in Lakeland and Naples are not intentionally
collocated with the concentration of nursing homes or elderly
residents, which may increase the incidence of preventable
deaths if access is limited by storm-related debris or roadway
damage (Figs. 2 and 3).

b. Temperatures
Lakeland and Naples experienced hot weather with temperatures in excess of 908F (;328C) in the days following Hurricane
Irma. Both locations also recorded dewpoints greater than 708F
(;218C) (National Centers for Environmental Information
2017). Dewpoint directly effects human comfort— the higher
the dewpoint, the muggier it will feel. Heat and high humidity
reduce human thermoregulation, particularly for vulnerable
populations such as the elderly.
At Lakeland Linder Regional Airport, maximum temperatures ranged from 868 to 928F (308–;338C) in the days following Hurricane Irma. Dewpoints exceeded 708F daily.
Similarly, Naples Municipal Airport recorded temperatures
between 878 and 918F (;318–;338C). While slightly lower than
in Lakeland, Naples’s 688F (208C) dewpoint coupled with the
elevated maximum temperature, did not provide relief even
during the overnight hours. Lows at Lakeland did not fall
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FIG. 2. Nursing-home locations in Lakeland (adapted from U.S.
Census Bureau 2012).

FIG. 3. Nursing-home locations in Naples.

below 758F (;248C), and those at Naples remained 688F and
above in the time between Hurricane Irma and full power restoration (National Centers for Environmental Information 2017).
Temperatures in Naples exceeded the maximum 818F allowed by Rule 59 A-4.1265 for 10 days and those in Lakeland
for 8 days before power was fully restored. Nursing homes
without power would have, consequently, exceeded the maximum temperature. Power was restored within 10 days in
Lakeland and 12 days in Naples (Guinn 2017; Riley 2017).
A study of two other Florida counties after Hurricane Irma
found approximately half of households used a generator and
attributed it to an improved experience, but access varied
based on race and past disaster experience (Chakalian et al.
2019). Chakalian et al. (2019) recommended ‘‘infrastructure
like’’ generators to restore power to whole neighborhoods
during prolonged power outages. Florida’s nursing homes, by
virtue of Rule 59 A-4.1265, offer insight into the challenges
associated with implementing such an initiative.
Throughout Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina, 20 deaths
were associated with a power outage compounding an existing
medical condition, either from lack of air conditioning (AC) or
failed medical equipment. Seventy percent (14 deaths) of these
occurred at a skilled nursing facility in Florida without power
for several days (Issa et al. 2018; Pierce and West 2017).
Nursing homes and hospitals were prioritized by each county’s

emergency management agency and many had power restored
sooner than other businesses and residents. Not all nursing
homes in Naples and Lakeland lost power and those that did,
even for a few hours, were able to activate existing generators.

3. Method
This research addresses gaps in the literature regarding the
role of interagency connections in reducing timelines for
compliance with hazard mitigation regulations in a postdisaster
setting. It also analyzes the effects of preexisting technology
deficiencies and utilization of external partners to remediate
them upon implementation timelines for generator upgrades.

a. Participant selection
The facility and provider locator on the FloridaHealthFinder.gov
website identified 11 nursing homes in Collier County and 24
in Polk County. A total of six nursing homes from each county
were included in the study. Zip codes were the most detailed level
of analysis available for comparing nursing homes. Those with
more than one nursing home per zip code were selected from
within the Naples area, including the following:
1) Harborchase of Naples and Solaris Senior Living North
Naples in zip code 34109,
2) Bentley Care Center and Solaris Healthcare Imperial in zip
code 34110, and
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FIG. 4. Fixed generator—Lakeland.

3) The Arlington of Naples and Manorcare of Lely Palms in
zip code 34113.
Two zip codes within Lakeland had the highest concentration
of nursing homes:
1) Consulate Health Care at Lake Parker, Lakeland Hills
Center, and Lakeland Nursing and Rehabilitation in zip
code 33805 and
2) Consulate Health Care of Lakeland, The Manor at
Carpenters Way, and Wedgewood Healthcare Center
in zip code 33809.
Although this is a small subset of nursing homes affected by the
disaster, the range of health care and power infrastructure

systems represented allowed for generalizations to be made
about how emergency power supplies and interagency connections contribute to maintaining care.

b. Data collection and analysis
On-site observation was conducted on 8 and 9 October
2017—four weeks after Hurricane Irma passed through the two
areas. This timeframe was selected to identify the facilities
emergency power resources prior to the implementation of
upgrades resulting from the governor’s order. We visited each
nursing home with publicly accessible grounds to document the
presence of externally visible emergency power supplies,
using a camera that encoded geographic coordinates to each
photograph (Figs. 4 and 5 ). Gated facilities neither provided

FIG. 5. Portable generator—Naples.
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TABLE 1. Polk County life-safety inspection results and corrective actions from 10 October 2016 through 10 October 2017 (source: adapted
from Florida Agency for Health Care Administration Form 3020–001).
Facility

Life-safety deficiencies

Consulate Health Care of Lake Parker
Consulate Health Care of Lakeland

None
Exit door timing delay

Lakeland Hills Center
Lakeland Nursing and Rehabilitation

None
Sprinkler maintenance

The Manor at Carpenters
Wedgewood Healthcare Center

None
Fire alarm panel testing and
maintenance

physical access nor information via telephone or e-mail to
those unaffiliated with government agencies or private electrical contractors during this transitional period. One Lakeland
facility and three Naples facilities could not be photographed
because gates prevented entry. A geographic information
system was used to analyze the spatial distribution of hospital,
emergency power resources, acute care facilities, and population demographics.
The progression of compliance with the governor’s
emergency action was determined from the consumerfriendly summaries of each nursing home’s emergency
power plan through January 2019 (Tables 1 and 2) (Florida
Agency for Health Care Administration 2018b). Technological
and interagency capacities to comply with fire safety
requirements before the deadline were assessed from
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration life-safety
code inspection reports dated within a year of Hurricane
Irma (Tables 3 and 4) (Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration 2018b). These summaries and reports were
quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. Qualitative entries from both the reports and summaries were coded
manually based on emergent themes: (i) technology or
procedural violation, (ii) external or internal remediation,
(iii) fixed or mobile generator, and (iv) partial or full facility
emergency power supply. Relevant terms were paired with
frequency counts to determine how often the various types
of violations, remediation techniques, and improvement
goals occurred.

Corrective-action resources

Date

Not applicable
Internal signage; internal procedure
update
Not applicable
External contractor repair; internal
procedure update
Not applicable
Internal maintenance; internal procedure
update

19 Jun 2017
28 Mar 2017
20 Jun 2017
10 May 2017
14 Feb 2017
5 Dec 2016

4. Results
a. Life-safety code inspections
Life-safety code adherence in Florida nursing homes is
assessed during annual unannounced inspections conducted by
the fire marshal. Corrections in both cities required approximately one month to complete and be reinspected. Previous
deficiencies indicate the timeliness with which nursing homes
might comply with the new Emergency Action to maintain
temperatures.
Three nursing homes in Lakeland and three in Naples did
not have reported deficiencies in the year leading up to
Hurricane Irma (Tables 1 and 2). Of the remaining three facilities in Polk County, deficiencies potentially associated with
generator safety included delayed access to areas with door
codes, missed fire alarm testing, and missed maintenance of fire
alarms and sprinklers. External contractors were called to one
facility to remediate deficiencies. Internal procedures were
updated to reflect these remediation contracts and internal
maintenance performed at two other facilities. At a facility
shared by two health care providers one had deficiencies and
the other did not.
Deficiencies reported in Naples nursing homes included inadequate signage for fire doors, missed tests of fire detectors
and sprinklers, inaccessible hallways, and failure to conduct a
systems risk assessment. External contractors were called to
two facilities to remediate and consult on electrical risks.
Internal procedures were updated to reflect these remediation

TABLE 2. Collier County life-safety inspection results and corrective actions from 10 October 2016 through 10 October 2017 (source:
adapted from Florida Agency for Health Care Administration Form 3020–001).
Facility

Life-safety deficiencies

Corrective-action resources

Inspection date

Bentley Care Center
Harborchase of Naples
Manorcare at Lely Palms
Solaris Healthcare Imperial

None
Fire door labeling; fire detector testing
None
Corridor accessibility; sprinkler testing;
building systems risk assessments

31 Oct 2016
25 Sep 2017
13 Jun 2017
8 May 2017

Solaris Senior Living North
Naples
The Arlington of
Naples, Inc.

Fire detector testing

Not applicable
Internal procedure update
Not applicable
Internal maintenance; internal procedure
updates; external contractor repair;
external contractor review
Internal procedure update; external
contractor consultation
Not applicable

None

7 Mar 2017
3 Jan 2017
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TABLE 3. Polk County nursing-home emergency power supply updates (generated by authors from consumer-friendly summaries of
emergency power plans).

Facility

Plan approved

Implementation

Consulate Health Care at
Lake Parker
Consulate Health Care of
Lakelanda
Lakeland Hills Center
Lakeland Nursing and
Rehabilitationa
The Manor at Carpenters
Wedgewood Healthcare
Centera

27 Apr 2018

1 Jan 2019

27 Apr 2018

1 Jan 2019

24 Oct 2017
12 Dec 2017

20 Oct 2017
1 Jan 2019

24 Oct 2017
27 Apr 2018

4 Oct 2017
1 Jan 2019

a

Alternate power
source

Emergency power supports
AC, life-safety systems, lights, and
refrigeration
AC, life-safety systems, lights, and
refrigeration
Not reported
AC, heat, life-safety systems, lights, and
refrigeration
Entire facility
AC, life-safety systems, lights, and
refrigeration

Fixed generator
Fixed generator
Not reported
Fixed and portable
generator
Fixed generator
Fixed generator

Deficiencies reported in life-safety inspection from within one year of Hurricane Irma.

contracts. The other nursing home in Naples had not corrected
the deficiencies by the date of the study, but the time limitation
to do so had not expired. Although successful maintenance of
life safety was not consistent within counties or even the same
facility, nursing homes across the state supplemented internal capacity and comprehension of life-safety requirements through relationships with external contractors and
external inspection.
A lack of deficiencies related to generators from the year
before Hurricane Irma indicates that generators were up to
regulatory standards for storm induced power outages, however, the amount of space cooled per resident and duration of
cooling was not as strictly regulated at that time. Collaborative
oversight from fire marshals, county emergency management,
and the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration
guided the actions taken to ensure that technology was sufficient to prevent future heat-related deaths in nursing homes.

b. Emergency power plans
County emergency management approves comprehensive
emergency plans for nursing homes and reports the date and a
summary of the emergency power plan portion of the comprehensive plan to the Florida Agency for Health Care

Administration (2018a) (Tables 3 and 4). Revised emergency
power plans were approved at two facilities in Lakeland and
none in Naples by the original deadline set by the governor. By
the end of 2017, one additional facility in Lakeland and one in
Naples had approved plans. The remaining three facilities in
Lakeland received approval in April 2018. Two additional
plans were approved for Naples-based facilities by the end of
May 2018. The other three were approved after the beginning
of the next hurricane season, with the last one on 1 August
2018. Delays in plan approval might have occurred at the facility or emergency management level.
Building plans for expanded emergency power supplies
are reviewed by the Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration and inspections for compliance are completed
by the local fire marshal. Compliance dates were reported in
the consumer-friendly summaries (Tables 3 and 4). Three facilities, one in Naples and two in Lakeland, were compliant
before the emergency action deadline. One Naples facility
implemented its emergency power plan before its approval.
The other facilities received extensions until 31 December
2018 or 1 January 2019. All the facilities with life-safety deficiencies from the past year had extensions for compliance
(Tables 3 and 4). Similarly, all the facilities with extensions

TABLE 4. Collier County nursing-home emergency power supply updates (generated by authors from consumer-friendly summaries of
emergency power plans).
Facility
Bentley Care Center

Harborchase of Naplesa
Manorcare at Lely Palms
Solaris Healthcare
Imperiala
Solaris Senior Living
North Naplesa
The Arlington of
Naples, Inc.
a

Plan approved

Implementation

Emergency power supports

Alternate power source

Not reported

31 Dec 2018

Life-safety systems, lights,
elevator, and certain receptacles

31 May 2018 and 29
Mar 2019
5 Dec 2017
1 Aug 2018

1 Jan 2019

Entire facility

Fixed generator, fuel
storage transfer trailer,
and portable generator
Fixed generator

1 Jan 2019
31 Dec 2018

Not reported
AC

Not reported
Portable generator

23 Jul 2018

1 Jan 2019

AC, lights, and refrigeration

Portable generator

7 Jun 2018

8 Nov 2017

AC, heat, life-safety systems,
lights, and refrigeration

Fixed generator

Deficiencies reported in life-safety inspection from within one year of Hurricane Irma.
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until the last day of 2018 or first day of 2019 received additional
extensions into 2019.

c. Emergency power supplies
The nursing homes without gated entry that were publicly
accessible in both counties all had visible generators. Some
were on wheels, while others were not mobile (Figs. 4 and 5).
Fuel supplies and venting mechanisms were also evident at
each facility.
Emergency power plans detailed the fuel source, generator
capacity, and what it will support when upgraded (Tables 3 and
4). All the facilities in Lakeland will have fixed generators. Two
facilities in Naples will have exclusively portable generators.
One facility in each county will have a combination of fixed and
portable generators. Each county had one facility where no
data about the intended alternate power source was provided.
Although air conditioning or spot coolers will be supported
by generators, only one facility in each county will be fully
supported by emergency power. Heat will also be supported by
emergency power supplies at one additional facility in each
county. The Lakeland facilities generate power to support lifesafety systems, lights, and refrigeration. In Naples, life-safety
systems, lights, and refrigeration will be supported at two,
three, and two facilitates, respectively. One Naples facility,
which uses spot coolers instead of air conditioning for emergency cooling, will power specific electrical outlets during an
emergency, which may provide more options for what to run in
addition to those. Supporting refrigeration, life-safety systems,
lights, and power receptacles bolsters service provision in
emergencies. For example, oxygen compressors require power
to receptacles and some medications, such as those for diabetes, require refrigeration. Facilities that only meet the
minimum requirement to support emergency power to air
conditioning systems will be compliant but will not receive
the full benefit of life-sustaining technologies.

5. Conclusions
The outcomes from these nursing homes show that basing
legislation and implementation deadlines on public response
does not necessarily result in timely execution or maximized
safety benefits even when collective action is undertaken. The
timely compliance with new emergency mitigation legislation
is facilitated by compliance history including existing equipment and previous utilization of external partners. The occurrence of Hurricane Irma in these specific cities did not cause
consistent implementation of new mitigation technology requirements prior to the next hurricane season.
For nursing homes to be more resilient, facility maintenance
and relationships with technicians, county and state agencies
should be prioritized. The facilities in this study have either
become compliant or received extensions indicating that their
agency connections have been sufficient to sustain perceived
resilience throughout the implementation process. Ultimately,
compliance with regulations or best practices regarding generator capacity will impact the ability for distributed power
generation to provide resilience during emergencies.
Future mitigation policies should account for a range of facility resources including collective agency for the sector in

VOLUME 12

setting implementation timelines. This study establishes a
baseline for research on the role of agency and experience in
precautionary mitigation at nursing homes. Similar approaches
may be used for other hazardous events (e.g., Abi-Samra and
Malcolm 2011).
Hurricane Irma reiterated the need for continuous improvement and monitoring of emergency preparedness for
nursing homes in the state of Florida. The state may benefit
from continued longitudinal analysis of compliance with and
expansion beyond emergency power generation requirements.
Perceived increases in preparedness by nursing-home administration, government partners, mitigation technicians, as well
as, nursing-home residents, their families, and Florida voters
should also be assessed through interviews, surveys, and focus
groups to determine the effectiveness of Rule 59 A-4.1265 for
the sector. Further, emergency simulations should be conducted with nursing-home administration and staff, as well as
external contractors and officials (Whytlaw 2018). Emergency
exercises allow for detailed network analysis and testing of updated comprehensive emergency plans including generator
capacity increases, transfer agreements with hospitals and
preferred provider agreements with electrical technicians,
which are critical to preventing adverse health outcomes from
power failure. Because these documents are exempt public
records, which are not accessible during ongoing litigation or
increased security concerns, both agency connections and
public opinion may benefit from such emergency exercises.
Standards for emergency power supplies at nursing homes
should consider the area’s temperatures and power failure risk,
as well as industry-specific resources. The surrounding population and facility mitigation options remain at risk until infrastructure for emergency power supplies at nursing homes
is improved to withstand prolonged outages. Regional and
comparative studies at elder-care facilities should be conducted to establish a framework for managing interagency
connections to promote rapid policy development and implementation to mitigation of heat exposure.
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